


A Model-Based Safety and Security Analysis for Energy Systems

Sibylle Fröschle


Setting and Problem

- Energy systems such as wind farms are operated by SCADA systems, which comprise several layers of networks and control units for data acquisition, (remote) monitoring, and (remote) control.
- The great progress in data-centric methods has led to increasingly sophisticated anomaly detection systems, which typically work on the dynamical system level.
- **Challenge:** These techniques are typically decoupled from the technical level. But it is the latter where attacks are realized and shape what an attacker might be able to do at the dynamical system level.



Source: "Robustness of Short-Term Wind Power Forecasting against False Data Injection Attacks" by Yao Zhang, Fan Lin and Ke Wang is licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Generic attack categories for feedback control systems



Examples of technical attacks and mitigation measures

| CN | Attack | Signals | Mitigation Measures | Constraints | Feasibility |
|-------|------------------|----------------|---|--|-------------|
| TA1 | | | | | |
| FNC1 | Wired PitM at C1 | All left of C1 | — | None | High |
| FNC1 | Wired PitM at C1 | All left of C1 | Phys. access control | None | Low |
| TA2 | | | | | |
| FNC1 | Wired PitM at C1 | All left of C1 | Phys. access control | None | Low |
| WLAN1 | Wireless PitM | All via AP1 | — | None | High |
| WLAN1 | Wireless PitM | All via AP1 | Secure passwd & update process | None | Medium |
| WLAN1 | Jamming | All via AP1 | — | Only \perp signal | High |
| TA3 | | | | | |
| CAN1 | Phys. Attacker | All on CAN1 | Phys. access control | None | Low |
| CAN1 | Remote Attacker | All on CAN1 | SW Security | No stealthy write with simultaneous read | Medium |
| CAN1 | Remote Attacker | All on CAN1 | SW Security Debug lock-down + CAN filter at GW1 | Write: only injection | Medium |

Publications

- Sibylle Fröschle. The quest for a model-based safety and security analysis: a hybrid solution. Draft paper.
- Sibylle Fröschle and Martin Kubisch. Key establishment for maintenance with machine to machine communication in transportation: security process and mitigation measures. International Journal on Advances in Security, 17(3&4):142-155, 2024.
- Sibylle Fröschle and Martin Kubisch. Three taps for secure machine-to-machine communication: towards high assurance yet fully local machine pairing. In Proceedings of CPS&IoT Security and Privacy, CPSIoTSec'24, pages 125-133. Association for Computing Machinery, 2024.

Our Approach

1. Model generic attack categories for feedback control systems into a representation of the SUC (System under Consideration) as a hybrid system H (e.g. hybrid automaton). Result: the SUT under attack H^A .
2. Tie the analysis at the dynamical system level to an analysis at the technical level to resolve:
 - Relevancy of attack modes, feasibility of the attacker to reach an attack mode, constraints of the attacker on how to manipulate data

Translate this into model parameters of H^A .
3. Explore whether and how the safety impact can be mitigated by detection measures. Thereby elicit new failure modes specific to attacks or new causes to existing failure modes.

The Overall Process

