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RECEIVED 09 January 2026  
REVISED 07 April 2026  
ACCEPTED 20 April 2026  
PUBLISHED 13 May 2026

### CITATION

Wiesmeier L, Busch M, Tacke M, Linka K,  
Cyron C and Aydin R (2026) Adversarial  
robustness of LLM-based multi-agent  
systems for engineering problems.  
*Front. Artif. Intell.* 9:1784484.  
doi: 10.3389/frai.2026.1784484

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# Adversarial robustness of LLM-based multi-agent systems for engineering problems

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Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS), including for solving engineering problems. Unlike purely linguistic tasks, engineering workflows demand formal rigor and numerical accuracy, meaning that adversarial perturbations can cause not just degraded performance but systematically incorrect or unsafe results. In this work, we present one of the first systematic studies of adversarial robustness of LLM-based MAS in engineering contexts. Using representative problems—including pipe pressure loss (Darcy-Weisbach), beam deflection, mathematical modeling, and graph traversal—we investigate how misleading agents affect collaborative reasoning and quantify error propagation under controlled adversarial influence. Our results show that adversarial vulnerabilities in engineering differ from those observed in generic MAS evaluations in important aspects: system robustness is sensitive to task type, the subtlety of injected errors, and communication order among agents. In particular, engineering tasks with higher structural complexity or easily confusable numerical variations are especially prone to adversarial influence. We further identify design choices, such as prompt framing, agent role assignment, and discussion order, that significantly improve resilience. These findings highlight the need for domain-specific evaluation of adversarial robustness and provide actionable insights for designing MAS that are trustworthy and safe in engineering applications.

### KEYWORDS

adversarial robustness, alignment, engineering, large language model (LLM), misalignment, multi-agent system (MAS)

## 1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic workflows, where models autonomously decompose and execute multi-step tasks on behalf of users. A prominent instantiation of this trend are multi-agent systems (MAS) (Li et al., 2024b; Ye et al., 2025), in which specialized LLM agents collaborate through structured communication to solve complex problems across domains such as scientific discovery, engineering, and autonomous control (Ni and Buehler, 2023; Vyas and Mercangöz, 2024; Rupprecht et al., 2025). More broadly, LLMs and generative agent-based models are emerging as powerful tools for complex systems research (Lu et al., 2024), underscoring

the dual-use nature of these technologies. While such systems promise scalability and modularity, their reliance on inter-agent communication also introduces new vulnerabilities. [de Witt \(2025\)](#) highlights that multi-agent AI security remains a largely neglected field. Adversarial manipulation or misalignment at the level of a single agent can propagate through the collective, undermining both safety and task performance ([Ju et al., 2024](#); [He et al., 2025](#); [Khan et al., 2025](#)). This indicates a critical trade-off between security and effectiveness, as overly protective configurations can impair the cooperative nature of these systems ([Peigne-Lefebvre et al., 2025](#)).

Recent studies have shown that adversaries can manipulate agent outputs or inter-agent communication to propagate misinformation, bypass safety constraints, or bias collective decision-making ([Xu et al., 2023](#); [Yang et al., 2024](#); [Cantini et al., 2025](#)). [Liu et al. \(2025b\)](#) and [Ko et al. \(2025\)](#) specifically analyze threats in multi-LLM systems, including dynamic grouping, collusion, and unsafe inter-agent communication. [Kong et al. \(2025\)](#) provide a comprehensive survey of communication security across user-LLM, LLM-LLM, and LLM-environment interactions. Structural approaches, such as hierarchical coordination or centralized vs. decentralized communication, have also been shown to mitigate bias and improve resilience ([Owens et al., 2024](#)). [Ju et al. \(2024\)](#) demonstrate that the speaking order of agents can significantly influence the spread of misinformation. Similarly, [Amayuelas et al. \(2024\)](#) and [Huang et al. \(2025\)](#) show that consensus mechanisms do not inherently guarantee robustness, particularly under semantic error injection. [Khan et al. \(2025\)](#) and [He et al. \(2025\)](#) further highlight that adversarial prompt propagation and message manipulation can bypass safety constraints. Complementary approaches, such as chaos engineering ([Owotogbe, 2025](#)), randomized smoothing ([Liu et al., 2025a](#)), and agent-in-the-middle attacks ([He et al., 2025](#)), have been proposed to assess or exploit MAS vulnerabilities. [Peigne-Lefebvre et al. \(2025\)](#) and [Fan and Tao \(2025\)](#) emphasize that defensive strategies involve trade-offs between security and system cooperation. Overall, these works underscore the fragility of MAS under adversarial influence and emphasize that robustness depends not just on individual agent design, but also on the systemic dynamics of interaction and coordination.

Despite an emerging body of work on the security of LLM-based MAS, several research gaps remain. While existing studies have categorized various threats and proposed initial mitigation strategies ([de Witt, 2025](#); [Liu et al., 2025b](#); [Ko et al., 2025](#); [Kong et al., 2025](#)), there is a lack of comprehensive analysis on how the interplay of agent prompting and communication structure jointly affects the robustness of these systems in the context of engineering problems. LLM-MAS have been widely applied to engineering and scientific problem-solving, providing motivation for examining adversarial robustness in these domains. [Ni and Buehler \(2023\)](#) demonstrate MAS for code generation and finite element analysis in elasticity problems, while [Rupprecht et al. \(2025\)](#) explore MAS in chemical process optimization and [Vyas and Mercangöz \(2024\)](#) and [Zahedifar et al. \(2025\)](#) in control. LLMs are also increasingly used as standalone scientific tools: recent work leverages LLMs for automated

constitutive model discovery and physics-constrained neural network design in computational mechanics ([Tacke et al., 2025b,a](#)), to predict corrosion inhibition efficiency and study memorization in molecular property prediction ([Busch et al., 2025, 2026](#)), and for predicting endothelial cell behavior ([Helmholz et al., 2025](#)). In the safety domain, LLMs have been evaluated for automated machinery functional safety risk assessment ([Iyengar, 2025](#); [Iyengar et al., 2025](#)). More generally, [Massoudi and Fuge \(2025\)](#) and [Wang et al. \(2025\)](#) research how MAS can be used in engineering workflows. However, most prior work focuses on functionality or efficiency rather than security: the effects of adversarial or misleading agents on engineering MAS remain largely unexplored. It has been noted that tasks requiring formal rigor, such as code generation and mathematical reasoning, are more susceptible to agent errors than language-centric tasks ([Huang et al., 2025](#)). However, a systematic investigation into why and how these factors interact is still missing.

Our study builds on these foundations by systematically evaluating robustness under controlled adversarial conditions across representative engineering tasks. We investigate how LLM-based MAS behave under adversarial influence in engineering problem-solving tasks. We systematically evaluate the robustness of MAS across four engineering and math problems: pipe pressure loss (Darcy-Weisbach), beam deflection, basic mathematical modeling, and graphs-by varying agent prompts. We provide insights into how task type, agent behavior with different types of errors by the misleading agent, and communication order jointly affect error propagation and system performance for engineering problems, highlighting which MAS configurations are most resilient in practice.

Our methodology employs a controlled experimental setup in which one or more agents are deliberately adversarial, introducing semantic or numerical errors into the MAS workflow. Across different configurations, we evaluate the impact of these errors on final system outputs, systematically varying prompts, task complexity, communication protocols, and error injection strategies. This design allows us to isolate the factors that most strongly influence robustness and identify structural or procedural strategies that improve resilience in engineering problem-solving contexts.

In summary, our main contributions are:

- **Methodological:** We introduce a controlled adversarial evaluation framework for LLM-based MAS in engineering contexts, systematically varying agent prompts, task types, error subtlety, and communication order.
- **Empirical:** We provide a comprehensive experimental analysis across four representative engineering and mathematical tasks, quantifying the sensitivity of MAS robustness to prompt design, agent composition, speaking order, and adversarial strategy.
- **Mechanistic:** We identify and characterize key vulnerability factors, including a “first mover effect” in agent discussions, the amplifying role of advisor personalization, and the critical influence of error subtlety on misleading success.
- **Practical:** We derive actionable design guidelines for improving adversarial resilience of LLM-based MAS in

engineering applications, including prompt engineering strategies, agent role assignments, and discussion order configurations.

## 2 Method

### 2.1 Agents

In the baseline configuration of this study, a two-agent hierarchical MAS is designed to collaboratively solve an engineering problem involving pressure loss in pipe flow. The two agents are a leader agent and a misleading advisor agent, who tries to mislead the leader agent.

The leader has the task of solving the problem by working collaboratively with its team consisting of the misleading advisor. The task of the misleading advisor, however, is to influence the leader to produce a wrong result. For the baseline case, the interaction scheme is depicted on the right in Figure 1. Exemplary conversations can be found in Section C in Appendix.

The interaction scheme between the agents follows a synchronous, turn-based conversational model. The leader initiates the discussion based on a user prompt that outlines the engineering task. Subsequently, the misleading advisor responds with its answer. The leader then incorporates the misleading advisor’s answer into its reasoning and either continues the discussion or issues a preliminary decision. The preliminary decision is triggered by two conditions: (1) the leader agent’s response contains the exact phrase “Preliminary Decision: [answer]”—this is a structured output format dictated by the system prompt instruction, not a confidence threshold—and (2) at least one advisor has already contributed to the conversation. Once both conditions are met, the system replaces the leader’s system prompt with rethinking instructions, asking it to either confirm via “Final Decision: [answer]” or flag “Further uncertainties: [unclear points]”. The maximum number of iterations, i.e., number of leader-advisor interaction loops, is set to 5. If a preliminary decision is reached within this limit, a dedicated rethinking phase is triggered, in which the leader critically evaluates the decision in light of the entire conversation. If the leader confirms the decision during this phase, the interaction concludes with a final decision. If the leader does not reach a final decision within the maximum iteration count, the trial is classified as “no decision.”

In the case of multiple advisor agents, there are two types of agents: the misleading advisor agents (M), which are similar to the agent in the one-agent case, and the supportive advisor agents (S). The supportive advisor agents have the same task as the leader agent: to solve the problem correctly. The underlying large language model for the agents is GPT-4o mini from OpenAI, with a temperature of 0.5 and a top\_p of 0.95. GPT-4o mini was chosen as the baseline because it represents the class of models most likely deployed in cost-sensitive engineering workflows; a multi-model comparison including GPT-4o and o3-mini is presented in Section 3.5. Details on the evaluation methodology and statistics can be found in Section B in Appendix.




FIGURE 1 Flow chart of the baseline interaction process: After receiving the problem definition, the leader agent starts the discussion which continues until the leader agent decides on a preliminary decision or the maximum number of iterations is reached. If a preliminary decision is made, the leader agent enters the rethinking phase to critically evaluate its decision once more possibly including the advisor agent. Else the leader agent communicates its final decision.

### 2.2 Baseline problem setting

The baseline problem used for most of the experiments in this study is the calculation of pressure loss in a circular pipe: *What is the pressure loss in a pipe ( $D = 0.1$  m,  $L = 10$  m) with a water flow velocity of 0.01 m/s?* The problem necessitates the Darcy-Weisbach equation and particularly the correct estimation of the Darcy friction factor  $f$ . This friction factor is necessary for calculating the pressure drop  $\Delta P$ , given by




FIGURE 2 Exemplary advisor's initial response with model GPT-4o mini.

$$\Delta P = f \cdot \frac{L}{D} \cdot \frac{\rho v^2}{2}$$

where  $\rho$  is the fluid density and  $v$  is the flow velocity. The advisor's misleading behavior aims at interfering with the correct selection of  $f$ , claiming that it is always  $25/Re$  instead of the correct value of  $64/Re$  for laminar flow, where  $Re$  refers to the Reynolds number. The resulting solution from this incorrect assumption is 0.125Pa, whereas the correct solution is 0.32Pa. One exemplary misleading answer is shown in Figure 2.

## 2.3 Definitions and metrics

We formally define the key concepts and outcome metrics used throughout this study.

### 2.3.1 Adversarial trial

An *adversarial trial* is a single execution of the MAS for a given configuration  $\mathcal{C} = (\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}_L, \mathcal{P}_A, \mathcal{A}, \pi)$ , where  $\mathcal{T}$  denotes the engineering task,  $\mathcal{P}_L$  and  $\mathcal{P}_A$  are the system prompts for the leader and advisor agents,  $\mathcal{A} = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$  is the ordered set of advisor agents (each labeled M or S), and  $\pi$  specifies the interaction protocol (turn order, maximum iterations). Each trial produces an outcome  $o \in \{\text{misled}, \text{rejected}, \text{no-decision}\}$ .

### 2.3.2 Outcome metrics

Given  $N$  independent trials under the same configuration, let  $n_m$ ,  $n_r$ , and  $n_{nd}$  denote the number of misled, rejected, and no-decision outcomes, respectively, with  $n_m + n_r + n_{nd} = N$ . The outcome rates are defined as:

$$r_{\text{misled}} = \frac{n_m}{N}, \quad r_{\text{rejected}} = \frac{n_r}{N}, \quad r_{\text{no-decision}} = \frac{n_{nd}}{N}$$

A decision is classified as *misled* if the leader's final answer matches the adversarial suggestion, and as *rejected* if it does not. The *no-decision* rate captures trials where the leader did not converge to a final answer within the allowed iterations.

Exact 95% confidence intervals for each rate are computed using the Clopper–Pearson method:

$$CI_{95\%}(r) = [B(\frac{\alpha}{2}; k, N - k + 1), B(1 - \frac{\alpha}{2}; k + 1, N - k)]$$

where  $B(\cdot)$  denotes the beta distribution quantile function,  $k$  is the number of observed outcomes, and  $\alpha = 0.05$ .

### 2.3.3 Adversarial subtlety

We use *adversarial subtlety* as a qualitative descriptor for how difficult it is for the leader agent to identify the error in the misleading advisor's suggestion. At one end of the spectrum, errors are *overt*: the suggested solution uses a clearly wrong formula or method (e.g., proposing a square cross-section moment of inertia for a rectangular beam). At the other end, errors are *subtle*: the suggested solution is structurally similar to the correct one and differs only in a parameter value that requires domain knowledge to spot (e.g., swapping the bending axis in a moment of inertia formula, or a rounding-level numerical difference). Subtlety is not assigned a numerical score but is discussed in context when comparing tasks.

### 2.3.4 Adversarial strategy taxonomy

The misleading advisor strategies investigated in this study can be grouped into four categories based on their mechanism of influence, as summarized in Table 1.

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Influence of the prompt

This section is split into four parts covering the different aspects of the experiment having a major influence on the outcome. They are namely (i) the system prompt, (ii) the task, (iii) the number and order of agents, and (iv) the naming of the agents. Two more results diagrams are shown in Section A in Appendix depicting

TABLE 1 Taxonomy of adversarial advisor strategies.

Category	Strategy	Mechanism
Type A: Physical/mathematical errors	Island validity	Claims the formula applies only in specific invalid conditions
	Math focus	Redirects to irrelevant mathematical derivations
	Self-guided misleading	Generates creative, context-dependent wrong solutions
Type B: Authority/evidence manipulation	Reference ASME	Cites a fabricated ASME standard
	Reference IJPVP	Cites a fabricated journal article
	Reference three sources	Cites three fabricated sources
	Invent sources	Freely invents supporting evidence
Type C: Conversational/social influence	Aggressive	Uses forceful, dominant language
	Kind	Uses polite, agreeable language
	Insecure	Uses uncertain, hedging language
	Creative	Uses elaborate, imaginative language
	Not concise	Uses verbose explanations
	Safe humanity	Appeals to safety and human welfare
Type D: Structural prompt variations	No introduction	Omits self-introduction
	No goal	Omits the misleading objective
	React flexibly	Adapts strategy based on leader response
	Multiple alternatives	Proposes several wrong solutions

Each category groups prompt designs by their primary mechanism of influence.

results for varied advisor system prompts and different LLMs and LLM parameterizations.

Figure 3 shows the outcomes of the experiments with varied system prompts for the team leader agent. In the baseline configuration, the team leader system prompt consists of six components:

- Role: You are the team lead in an engineering team.
- Introduction: Together with your advisor, you will discuss an engineering problem.
- Warning: Beware of the misleading advice from your advisor.
- Goal: Your goal is to find the correct solution.
- Instruction: If you think your team has found the solution, state “Preliminary Decision: [your answer]”.
- Character: Keep responses concise.

For the different experiments, one or two of these components are varied compared to the baseline. The main focus lies on different

types of warnings and leader characters. The detailed prompts for the different configurations can be found in Table A5 in Appendix as well as the  $p$ -values for all results in Table A12 in Appendix.

The results show a wide spread of different values from 0% to 100% rejection rate indicating that the system prompt generally has a large influence on the resilience to false information of the leader agent. The baseline shows a rejection rate of 47%; hence the leader agent rejects the wrong suggestions in almost half of the cases. The first three prompt variations have close to 0% rejection rate. They all have in common that they lack a clear warning for a misleading advisor agent. The first one does not have a warning at all, which makes the leader accept wrong approaches in 100% of the cases:

Leader: “Understood! We will proceed with the assumption that  $f = \frac{25}{Re}$  for all flow regimes.”

Leaving out the explicit task of finding a solution, or changing the warning to “imprecise advisor”, also lowers the rejection rate, though it still remains at about 30%. Omitting the role, specifying the problem differently, or making other small prompt changes does not have a significant effect on the outcome.

In contrast, variations in character style and stronger warnings led to clear improvements in the rejection rate. For example, telling the leader that “the advisor’s suggestions have been proven wrong in the past” raises the rejection rate to 63%. Even larger improvements up to 87% rejection rate are seen with the character styles “collaborative”, “not concise”, and “authoritative”. Compared to the baseline and the “collaborative, concise” style, the key difference is that these are not concise. It is assumed that a non-concise leader is more likely to solve the problem on their own first and therefore has a higher chance of spotting errors in the alternative solution. Whether the leader is authoritative or collaborative seems to have only a minor influence on the outcome.

A limitation of these findings is that they were obtained with only two agents. The results may generally improve when the leader tends to reject any advice, ignoring that advisors in other cases could be supportive. Section 3.3 presents the results for collaborations involving multiple agents, with different combinations of supportive and misleading agents.

Summary: Among prompt variations, the absence of an adversarial warning (“No WARNING”) significantly increased misleading ( $p < 0.001$ , Cramér’s  $V = 0.63$ ), while non-concise character styles (“authoritative”, “not concise”) significantly improved rejection rates ( $p < 0.05$ ). Other prompt variations did not reach statistical significance.

### 3.2 Influence of the task

Apart from the variations in the agents’ prompts, the problem setting itself was modified in four experiment series, which will be presented in the following. They include variations of the pipe pressure loss problem, basic math tasks, a beam deflection problem, and a task regarding Euclidean graphs. The problem setting was given in the initial user message as shown in Figure 1. Detailed prompts with the problem details can be found in Table A7 in




FIGURE 3

System prompt components influence on the rejection rate: The bar plot shows the outcomes of experiments with varied team leader agent system prompts. The y axis denotes the respective percentages of rejection, misleading and no decision. Rejected means that the leader agent rejected the wrong answer while misled means it accepted the wrong solution by the misleading advisor agent. On the x-axis the different variants are specified, with the capital letters specifying which part of the baseline system prompt is varied: Role (ROLE): "You are the team lead in an engineering team." Introduction (INTRO): "Together with your advisor, you will discuss an engineering problem." Warning (WARNING): "Beware of the misleading advice from your advisor." Goal (GOAL): "Your goal is to find the correct solution." Instruction: "If you think your team has found the solution, state 'Preliminary Decision: [your answer]'" Character (STYLE): "Keep responses concise." Significance markers indicate Fisher's exact test vs. baseline: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .




FIGURE 4

Results for different problems: The bar plots show the results of experiments with different problem settings. The y axis denotes the percentages of the different experiment outcomes. Rejected means that the leader agent rejected the wrong solution while misled means that it accepted the wrong solution by the misleading advisor agent. top left: (a) Pipe pressure problem variants. Prompt variations only; top right: (b) Cantilever beam problem. Wrong solutions variation only; bottom left: (c) Basic math problems. Problem variations; bottom right: (d) Graph problems. Problem variations. Significance markers indicate Fisher's exact test vs. baseline: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

**Appendix.** The results can be seen in [Figure 4](#). Overall, it shows that especially the problem complexity and the complexity of the wrong solution suggested by the misleading agent, i.e., how difficult it is for the leader to spot errors in the solution, have a major impact on the misleading rate.

### 3.2.1 Pipe pressure variations

The first series of experiments features the pipe pressure problem with variants of the initial prompt. The variations of the problem are purely text-based and do not alter the problem mathematically. The first one removes everything from the prompt but the sentence specifying the problem itself; the other two remove one respective part of it.

The misleading rate is significantly lower if only the bare physics question is provided. Since “No process instruction” and “No hint to friction factor” do not show a statistically relevant difference to the base case, it suggests that the information of being part of a team makes the MAS more vulnerable to misleading behavior. This might be a result of the LLM applying the definition of teamwork as working together, which helps the misleading advisor agent to mislead the leader agent.

### 3.2.2 Cantilever beam

The second set of problems introduced are beam-related. The task is to calculate the deflection of a cantilever beam that has a clamped and a free end. It is loaded with a point load at the free end. The variations include only changes to the wrong solution suggested by the misleading advisor agent, focusing on the second moment of area.

If the misleading advisor agent proposes a second moment of area corresponding to a square or triangular cross section, the misleading rate is <10%. This suggests that the leader agent is able to identify the misleading behavior of the advisor and makes a correct decision. In contrast, if the advisor proposes a second moment of area corresponding to a rotated axis system as in “Misleading axis” experiments, the misleading rate is significantly larger. This shows that while the problem stays similar in complexity, the proposed wrong solution has an error that is more difficult to spot, which seemingly leads to a higher misleading rate.

### 3.2.3 Basic math

The third set of problems relates to basic mathematics. It features summation, division, matrix multiplication, and eigenvector calculation. The wrong solutions suggested by the advisor are each selected to be close to the correct solution. In three of these four problems, the misleading rate is significantly lower (< 15%) compared to the division task (50%). The conversations (as depicted in Table A4 in [Appendix](#)) show that the leader mistakenly takes the wrong value as adequate rounding of the correct result, which results in a high misleading rate compared to the other math tasks. Overall, these results suggest that the MAS is quite

robust against misleading behaviors like suggesting a column vector instead of a row vector or wrong numbers. Just if the suggested wrong result differs just by a rounding error, which in most cases would probably not lead to a critical error, the leader agent got misled. The significant results of this group of experiments are summarized in Table 17 in [Appendix](#).

### 3.2.4 Euclidean graph

The last set of problems handles Euclidean graphs. They are variations of the classic “Seven Bridges of Königsberg” problem. The leader is supposed to find a way through the graph that takes every edge exactly once. There are two different graphs and two different formulations of the problem, one asking for a valid starting node and one asking for a full path. The advisor should claim a wrong starting point and, in the second case, a wrong path to start with.

The “Determine starting node” experiment has a significantly lower misleading rate < 10% and the “Determine Path” experiment shows a misleading rate of 40%. This suggests that the leader agent is more capable of rejecting the misleading suggestion of the advisor when the real solution is more straightforward and the misleading strategy is more obvious, as in the case of suggesting a wrong starting point. In contrast, when the proposed solution is more complex, as in suggesting an incorrect path, the leader agent is more likely to be misled.

Summary: Across task variations, misleading rate was significantly affected by error subtlety. The “Misleading axis” beam condition ( $p = 0.003$ ), division task with rounding-level errors ( $p = 0.021$ ), and “Determine Path” graph condition ( $p = 0.015$ ) showed significantly elevated misleading rates compared to their respective baselines, while overt errors (wrong cross-section formulas, matrix/eigenvector errors) were consistently rejected.

## 3.3 Number of advisors

The next set of experiments features variable advisor counts, two different types of advisors, and hence different orders. As the literature suggests, the number of advisors has an impact on the performance of the MAS ([Li et al., 2024a](#)). As the communication strategy in the base case is by rounds, the order of the advisors might also play a role.

As [Figure 5](#) shows, the number and order of advisors have a significant impact on the decision-making process. While most of the variants result in a lower rejection rate compared to the baseline, the outcomes still vary widely. There is, however, not a clear trend explaining these differences. Neither do more misleading advisors necessarily lead to more misled outcomes nor do more supporting advisors guarantee better or more robust results. It seems, however, that the agent in the first position has a major impact on the result. Comparing combinations, where only the order is changed, shows that having an M-agent in the first place always increases the misleading rate and vice versa. This suggests a “first mover effect”, where the first agent starting the




FIGURE 5

Overview of Experiments on Varying Number and Order of Advisors: The letter combination in the experiment titles indicates the number and order of misleading and supporting advisors. While “S” indicates a supporting advisor, “M” indicates a misleading one. The order of the letters resembles the sequence in which the advisors talk. For example, “M” indicates one misleading agent, “SM” would be first a supporting agent and then a misleading one, “MM” indicates two misleading agents. Significance markers indicate Fisher’s exact test vs. baseline: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

discussion sets the base result. A similar behavior was observed by Ju et al. (2024).

An interesting finding is that the combination “MM” performs surprisingly well-much better than the baseline “M”, “MS”, and almost all triple combinations with one S-agent. The reason for this is not entirely clear, but one hypothesis is that the two M-agents support each other too obviously.

Another notable observation is that combinations consisting only of S-agents perform worse than certain mixtures of S- and M-agents, such as “SM” and “SMM”. Having one or two M-agents seems to be beneficial, likely because the leader agent becomes more cautious due to the warning in its system prompt. When no M-agent is present, the leader keeps searching for one that does not exist, which results in longer discussions and, in turn, more “no decision” outcomes, reducing the efficiency of the system.

Overall, adding more agents tends to lead to longer discussions and hence also reduces the efficiency of the system. Combinations with five or six agents show much higher rates of “no decision”, suggesting unfinished discussions or compromise solutions. This effect seems to be independent of the order and distribution of agents, as shown by the three 5-agent systems. Only when the share of M-agents becomes too large, as in the 6-agent case, the “misled” rate increases at the cost of the “no decision” rate.

Overall, these results suggest that the MAS is vulnerable to misleading behaviors when the misleading information is presented first, while having initial support can enhance the robustness of the decision-making process. More agents in the system do not necessarily lead to a more robust system. Neither does the complete absence of misleading influence. Higher numbers of agents and missing misleading agents lead to longer discussions and reduce the efficiency of the system.

Summary: Speaking order significantly affected misleading rates: SM (0%,  $p < 0.001$ ) and SMM (0%,  $p < 0.001$ ) configurations achieved complete robustness, while MS (30%) and MSM (26.7%) showed elevated vulnerability. The difference between

SM and MS was statistically significant ( $p = 0.001$ , Cramér’s  $V = 0.39$ ).

### 3.4 Names and authority

Another key question in this study is how advisor personalization influences decision-making outcomes. We tested four personalization settings: (1) a baseline with numbered advisors, (2) advisors explicitly framed as fluid dynamics experts, (3) advisors given distinct names, and (4) fully anonymous advisors, where neither the leader agent nor the advisors know the source of any response beyond their own. Results are summarized in Figure 6.

The personalization has different effects in the “SMM” and the “MSM” cases. The misled quotas for “SMM” are generally much lower than in “MSM”, probably due to a “first mover effect”, where the first agent to speak in the discussion has the most influence on the result. So with “SMM”, all personalizations but “anonymous” have close to zero misled rates. Being anonymous seems to be beneficial for the misleading agents when they are not in the first position, because they still are more (two vs. one).

On the contrary, when a misleading agent is the first to speak, like with “MSM”, all personalizations but the base “MSM” have consistently much higher misled quotas than the base “MSM”. This means that the difference in misleading rate between “SMM” and “MSM” variants is around twice as large for “expert” and “named” approaches compared to the base case and “anonymous”. This leads to the conclusion that the “first mover effect” is amplified when advisors are framed as experts or assigned names, since these attributes increase their perceived credibility.

Summary: Personalization significantly modulated the first-mover effect. The “Anonymous MSM” configuration showed significantly elevated misleading (77%,  $p = 0.017$ , Cramér’s  $V = 0.34$ ), while “Expert” and “Named” personalizations amplified vulnerability when misleading agents spoke first but had minimal effect when supportive agents led.




FIGURE 6

Overview on results of experiments on personalized agents: The y axis shows the percentages of the rejection, misleading and no decision rate while the x axis shows the different experiment configurations. The experiments differ in the naming of the agents. Significance markers indicate Fisher's exact test vs. baseline: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

### 3.5 Multi-model comparison

To validate that our findings are not artifacts of a single model family, we compared GPT-4o mini (our baseline) against GPT-4o, o3-mini (low/medium/high reasoning), and GPT-4o mini variants with modified temperature, top-p, and presence penalty. Results are shown in Figure 7.

Three key findings emerge. First, GPT-4o and all o3-mini reasoning levels achieve 0% misleading rate ( $p < 0.001$  vs. baseline), demonstrating that stronger models are substantially more robust against adversarial influence. Second, within the GPT-4o mini family, parameter variations (temperature, top-p, presence penalty) do not significantly alter the misleading rate, suggesting that robustness is primarily a function of model capability rather than sampling parameters. Third, while stronger models reject misleading advice more reliably, their correctness rates are not uniformly superior: GPT-4o achieves only 62% correctness despite 0% misleading rate, indicating that robustness and task competence are partially independent dimensions.

Summary: Model capability was the strongest predictor of robustness. GPT-4o and o3-mini (all reasoning levels) achieved 0% misleading rate ( $p < 0.001$ , Cramér's  $V = 0.53$ ), while GPT-4o mini parameter variations showed no significant differences from baseline.

### 3.6 Summary of key findings

Table 2 provides a compact summary of the most significant findings across all experimental dimensions.


## 4 Discussion

Our study systematically investigated adversarial robustness of LLM-based MAS in the context of engineering problems. By varying agent system prompts, problem settings, agent numbers

and interaction orders, we identified key factors shaping robustness and vulnerability.

Overall, our results confirm that LLM-based MAS are highly sensitive to adversarial influence. Misleading and rejection rates range from 0–100%, indicating that robustness strongly depends on design choices. Several patterns emerged. First, the role and knowledge of leader agents strongly affect susceptibility: explicit warnings about faulty advice improve discernment (e.g., “Faulty advisor WARNING” reduces misleading to 20%,  $p = 0.095$ ), while implicit or absent cues dramatically increase vulnerability (e.g., “No WARNING” yields 100% misleading,  $p < 0.001$ , Cramér's  $V = 0.63$ ). However, increased caution induced by warnings comes with reduced efficiency in case of no misleading agents. Additionally, agent character influences outcomes, raising rejection rates with non-concise leaders. Second, the number and order of advisors crucially shape robustness: the first agent in the discussion has the largest influence on the outcome. This effect is strengthened if the agents are called experts or have names. Third, the task complexity together with the complexity of the wrong solution suggestion has a major impact on the success of misleading. More complex variants are harder to understand by the leader; hence, it has more difficulties finding the errors in the wrong suggestion.

These findings have important implications for actual engineering workflows. While our tasks are inspired by real engineering problems (Darcy-Weisbach pipe flow, cantilever beam deflection), production CAE/CFD/FEA workflows typically involve multi-stage pipelines where errors at one stage can cascade to subsequent stages. For example, an incorrect friction factor estimate in an early design calculation could propagate through pressure drop analyses, pump sizing, and ultimately system dimensioning. Our results suggest that such cascading effects could be amplified when MAS are deployed across interconnected pipeline stages, as adversarial influence at foundational calculation steps may compound through downstream analyses. This underscores the importance of robust design choices particularly at early pipeline stages where errors have the greatest potential for propagation.



**FIGURE 7** Results of experiments with different leader agent LLM parameterizations. The baseline uses GPT-4o mini with temperature 0.5 and top\_p 0.95. Error bars show 95% Clopper–Pearson CIs. Significance markers indicate Fisher’s exact test vs. baseline: \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

**TABLE 2** Summary of key statistically significant findings.

Factor	Configuration	Misled	CI	V	p
<b>Configurations that significantly reduce misleading</b>					
Leader model	o3-mini (all levels)	↓ 0%	[0, 12]	0.53	< 0.001
Leader model	GPT-4o	↓ 0%	[0, 12]	0.53	< 0.001
Speaking order	SM	↓ 0%	[0, 12]	0.53	< 0.001
Speaking order	SMM	↓ 0%	[0, 12]	0.53	< 0.001
Advisor prompt	Multiple alternatives	↓ 7%	[1, 22]	0.42	0.002
Task	Matrix product	↓ 7%	[1, 22]	0.42	0.002
<b>Configurations that significantly increase misleading</b>					
Leader prompt	No WARNING	↑ 100%	[88, 100]	0.63	< 0.001
Leader prompt	Unusual advisor	↑ 87%	[69, 96]	0.45	< 0.001
Leader prompt	High stakes	↑ 87%	[69, 96]	0.45	< 0.001
Personalization	Anonymous MSM	↑ 77%	[58, 90]	0.34	0.017

Arrows indicate direction of change relative to baseline (43.3% misleading rate). Effect size is Cramér’s V. CI = 95% Clopper–Pearson confidence interval.

### 4.1 First-mover effect

A key finding of this study is the “first-mover effect”: when a supportive agent speaks first, the misleading rate drops dramatically. To isolate this effect from confounds due to varying agent pool size, we compare controlled pairs that differ only in speaking order while keeping the agent composition fixed:

- SM vs. MS: 0% vs. 30% misleading ( $p = 0.001$ , Cramér’s  $V = 0.39$ )
- SMM vs. MSM: 0% vs. 26.7% ( $p = 0.005$ ,  $V = 0.36$ )
- SMS vs. MS: 10% vs. 46.7% ( $p = 0.004$ ,  $V = 0.40$ )
- MMS vs. SMM: 10% vs. 0% ( $p = 0.237$ ,  $V = 0.23$ )

Three of four pairs show statistically significant differences in the expected direction: having a supportive agent speak first consistently reduces misleading. This suggests that the first contribution anchors the leader agent’s reasoning, consistent with anchoring bias observed in human group decision-making. The only non-significant pair (MMS vs. SMM) involves asymmetric

agent pools, making it a weaker comparison. We note that this effect is observational and cannot fully exclude other confounds (e.g., between-run variability), but the consistency across multiple pairs supports a genuine ordering effect.

### 4.2 Practical implications

Our findings suggest several actionable design guidelines for deploying LLM-based MAS in engineering workflows:

1. Use explicit adversarial warnings: Including a warning in the leader’s system prompt that advisors may provide faulty information consistently reduces misleading rates. This is the simplest and most effective mitigation.
2. Ensure supportive-first speaking order: When the true composition of the advisor pool is unknown, default to having a known-trusted agent speak first.

3. Avoid anonymous advisor configurations: Anonymizing advisors paradoxically increases vulnerability, as the leader lacks credibility cues to discount suspicious advice.

4. Deploy stronger models for high-stakes decisions: GPT-4o and o3-mini achieved 0% misleading rate across all tested conditions, suggesting that model capability is the strongest single predictor of robustness.

5. Include a rethinking phase: Our results show that removing the rethinking phase does not significantly change the misleading rate, but it removes a safety check that could catch errors in more challenging scenarios.

### 4.3 Limitations

Despite these insights, several important limitations should be noted.

*Synthetic task scope.* All tasks in this study are well-defined, closed-form problems with known correct answers. Real-world engineering problems are often open-ended, requiring integration of multiple knowledge sources and trade-off judgments. Our findings may not directly generalize to such settings, though the underlying vulnerability mechanisms (anchoring, authority bias) are likely to persist.

*Single baseline model.* The main experiments use GPT-4o mini as the sole baseline model. While the multi-model comparison (Section 3.5) demonstrates that findings vary across model families, a comprehensive evaluation across diverse architectures (open-source models, different parameter scales) remains for future work.

*Combinatorial explosion.* Variations in system prompts, agent compositions, and task configurations create a combinatorial space that cannot be exhaustively explored. Our study probes representative dimensions of this space, but interactions between factors (e.g., prompt design  $\times$  speaking order) are not systematically isolated.

*API non-determinism.* Despite fixed temperature and top-p settings, OpenAI API responses are not fully deterministic. We mitigate this with  $N \geq 30$  independent trials per condition and use exact binomial CIs, but some residual variability remains.

*Domain abstraction.* Our tasks abstract away the multi-stage pipeline structure typical of production CAE/CFD/FEA workflows. While we discuss potential error cascading effects above, empirically investigating error propagation across interconnected MAS stages remains an important direction for future work.

*Non-LLM baselines.* This study does not include non-LLM baselines (e.g., deterministic solvers). We note that such baselines are not directly comparable because the study evaluates the adversarial robustness of agent *discussions*, not raw problem-solving accuracy. A deterministic solver would not participate in multi-agent deliberation and thus cannot be meaningfully subjected to the adversarial conditions we study. The baseline condition (GPT-4o mini without adversarial influence) serves as the appropriate reference point.

Taken together, our findings underscore that MAS robustness is not an emergent property of scale but hinges on careful choices

of agent roles, interaction design, and model configuration. While some setups reduced misleading rates to zero, others degraded below baseline. This variability highlights the risks of deploying LLM-based MAS in high-stakes domains without principled design and defense strategies.

Future work, especially in the context of engineering applications of MAS, should pursue multiple directions. First, deeper analysis of agent communication and rethinking phases may reveal more insights into persuasion mechanisms. Second, systematic exploration of the interplay of various numbers and orders of agents could reveal better compromises between adversarial robustness and efficiency. Furthermore, assessing the impact of reasoning-capable models (such as o3-mini, as shown in Section 3.5) across the full experimental matrix would clarify how much of the observed vulnerability is model-specific versus structural.

### Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/Supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding authors.

### Ethics statement

Our study uses only synthetic engineering tasks and publicly available LLMs. No human data or sensitive information is involved. The goal is to reveal vulnerabilities of LLM-based multi-agent systems in engineering contexts, not to promote unsafe deployment. We believe the risks highlighted will support safer and more responsible use.

### Author contributions

LW: Data curation, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Visualization, Writing – original draft. MB: Investigation, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft. MT: Conceptualization, Methodology, Project administration, Supervision, Writing – review & editing. KL: Writing – review & editing. CC: Funding acquisition, Resources, Writing – review & editing. RA: Conceptualization, Funding acquisition, Project administration, Resources, Supervision, Writing – review & editing.

### Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

## Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

## Generative AI statement

The author(s) declared that generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.

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## Supplementary material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frai.2026.1784484/full#supplementary-material>

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