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(Autonomous) weapon transfers as maximal jus ad vim? Lessons from Ukraine
Publikationstyp
Journal Article
Date Issued
2026-09-09
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Journal
Volume
102
Issue
5
Start Page
1607
End Page
1629
Citation
International Affairs 102 (5): 1607-1629 (2026)
Publisher DOI
Scopus ID
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Some scenarios justify the use of force, yet overriding political, moral or strategic concerns may argue against the outright use of a state's military. In such cases, transfers of weapons present would-be aiding states with means to apply force-short-of-war, or jus ad vim. This article argues that transferring sophisticated autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems represents a maximal means for exerting force without implicating one's own military or state in a direct fashion. Moreover, the article argues that, because such weapons can be argued to be merely weapons, such transfers allow one to avoid (or at least mitigate) concerns surrounding escalation while also working to avoid the risks of a ‘morally truncated victory’ or a situation of vis perpetua (permanent violence). In making these points, the article regularly looks to the ongoing example provided by the Russo-Ukrainian war, concluding with a practical examination of the limits of autonomous weapons and when their impact may not be as significant for the prospects of an aided state.
Subjects
arms transfers
autonomous weapon systems
escalation
jus ad vim
Russo-Ukrainian war
DDC Class
355: Military Science
623: Military Engineering and Marine Engineering