Kiener, MaximilianMaximilianKiener2023-05-032023-05-032021Journal of Moral Philosophy 24 (6): 1-29 (2021)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/15280This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather than the third party's coercion taken separately, and I will specify the conditions under which consent is invalid. My view, which is a novel version of what I call a Recipient-Focus-View, holds that coercion invalidates consent only if consent was 'obtained by' coercion, but not if consent was 'merely motivated by' coercion. I explain and support my view on the basis that it best reconciles an unnoticed tension between two fundamental principles in the debate on consent (which I call the Coercion Principle and the Permissibility Principle) and that it can deal with cases that undermine other Recipient-Focus-Views.en1740-468120216129AutonomyConsentResponsibilityThird-party coercionVoluntarinessJournal Article10.1163/17455243-20213548Other