Abromeit, ArnoldArnoldAbromeitBache, FlorianFlorianBacheBecker, Leon A.Leon A.BeckerGourjon, Marc OlivierMarc OlivierGourjonGüneysu, TimTimGüneysuJorn, SabrinaSabrinaJornMoradi, AmirAmirMoradiOrlt, MaximilianMaximilianOrltSchellenberg, FalkFalkSchellenberg2021-08-182021-08-182021-02Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE 2021)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/10122Physical side-channel attacks threaten the security of exposed embedded devices, such as microcontrollers. Dedicated countermeasures, like masking, are necessary to prevent these powerful attacks. However, a gap between well-studied leakage models and observed leakage on real devices makes the application of these countermeasures non-trivial. This work provides a gadget-based concept to automated masking covering practically relevant leakage models to achieve security on real-world devices. We realize this concept with a fully automated compiler that transforms unprotected microcontroller-implementations of cryptographic primitives into masked executables, capable of being executed on the target device. In a case study, we apply our approach to a bitsliced LED implementation and perform a TVLA-based security evaluation of its core component: the PRESENT s-box.enConference Paper10.23919/DATE51398.2021.9474183Other