Baranski, BastianBastianBaranskiSchmitt, KarlheinzKarlheinzSchmittSeis, DannyDannySeisSlodzinski, RafaelRafaelSlodzinskiSteeg, SimonSimonSteegWiemann, NilsNilsWiemannZimmermann, MarcMarcZimmermannBartz-Beielstein, ThomasThomasBartz-BeielsteinEhlers, RüdigerRüdigerEhlersKajendran, ThusinthanThusinthanKajendranKosslers, BjörnBjörnKosslersMehnen, JörnJörnMehnenPolaszek, TomaszTomaszPolaszekReimholz, RalfRalfReimholzSchmidt, Jens M.Jens M.Schmidt2020-10-222020-10-222006-108th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation (GECCO 2006)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/7636The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates that high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation.enJournal Article10.1145/1143997.1144065Other