Kiener, MaximilianMaximilianKiener2023-05-032023-05-032018-04Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 104 (2): 220-231 (2018-04)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/15283This essay criticises the atempt to explain the so-called normativity of law with reference to a model of coordination conventions. After specifying the explanandum of the normativity of law, I lay out the conceptions of 'coordination' and 'convention' and how the combination of both sets out to contribute to legal philosophy. I then present two arguments against such an account. Firstly, along a reductio ad absurdum, I claim that if an account of coordination conventions tries to explain the normativity of law by focusing on a coordination problem among judges it leads to self-contradiction. Secondly, I argue that even if one allows for widening the coordination problem beyond the group of judges, one is unable to account for the notion of duty. I will substantiate this second argument by distinguishing different scopes of the deontic operator "ought". I conclude by reconsidering what explaining the normativity of law could amount to.en0001-234320182220231Contingency of lawConventionCoordinationInstrumental rationalityJudicial dutyLegal positivismNormativity of lawRules of recognitionReview Article10.25162/arsp-2018-0013Other