Heinrich, TimoTimoHeinrichWeimann, JoachimJoachimWeimann2021-03-102021-03-102013-08-14Economics Letters 121 (2): 202-205 (2013-11)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/9097This note presents results from modified dictator games in which the payoff-relevant game is either chosen randomly or by the recipients. We do not observe reciprocal behavior when recipients choose the game: Dictators do not condition their donations on the game chosen by recipients.en0165-1765Economics letters20132202205Elsevierhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Laboratory experimentsModified dictator gamesReciprocityAllgemeines, WissenschaftA note on reciprocity and modified dictator gamesJournal Article10.15480/882.467410.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.00410.15480/882.4674Journal Article