Bratus, SergeySergeyBratusCrain, Adam J.Adam J.CrainHallberg, Sven MoritzSven MoritzHallbergHirsch, Daniel P.Daniel P.HirschPatterson, Meredith L.Meredith L.PattersonKoo, MaxwellMaxwellKooSmith, Sean W.Sean W.Smith2020-02-132020-02-132016-12-06ACM International Conference Proceeding Series : 45-53 (2016-12-06)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/4917We present an assurance methodology for producing significantly more secure implementations of SCADA/ICS protocols, and describe our case study of applying it to DNP3, in the form of a filtering proxy that deeply and exhaustively validates DNP3 messages. Unlike the vast majority of deployed proprietary DNP3 implementations, our code demonstrates resilience to state-of-the-art black-box as well as white-box fuzz-testing tools.enIngenieurwissenschaftenConference Paper10.1145/3018981.3018985Other