Heinrich, TimoTimoHeinrichMeemann, ChristinaChristinaMeemannStrobel, ChristinaChristinaStrobelTraub, StefanStefanTraub2025-03-242025-03-242025-03-21Technische Universität Hamburg (2025)https://hdl.handle.net/11420/54940Abstract In this paper, we study the role of courtesy in the solution of asymmetric social dilemmas. To this end, we introduce a novel game, the Courtesy Game, and show with the help of a laboratory experiment that an efficient equilibrium in the form of turn-taking, i.e., alternate play of the weakly dominant and weakly dominated strategies of the stage game, only emerges in a partner matching and in a few groups in which certain players take the lead. One conclusion from this result is that a ‘courtesy equilibrium’ does not arise spontaneously but requires explicit rules of conduct.enhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Courtesy Game | Social Dilemma | Social Preferences | Turn- Taking | ExperimentSocial Sciences::302: Social InteractionSocial Sciences::300: Social SciencesSocial Sciences::330: EconomicsNatural Sciences and Mathematics::519: Applied Mathematics, ProbabilitiesWorking Paperhttps://doi.org/10.15480/882.1495410.15480/882.14954Working Paper