Haruvy, ErnanErnanHaruvyHeinrich, TimoTimoHeinrichWalker, Matthew J.Matthew J.Walker2022-10-262022-10-262022-12Economics Letters (221): 110891 (2022-12)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/13838In first price sealed-bid auctions, a power probability weighting function is observationally equivalent to a model with constant relative risk aversion. By comparing auctions with different ceilings on a computerized opponent’s bid space, we can separate inverse S-shaped probability weighting as commonly used in the literature and risk-averse preferences from the distribution of observed bids. We find evidence to support both theories in the data. However, we also observe a significant number of violations after accounting for decision noise, which suggest that bidders’ valuations may be malleable to cues of the auction environment.en0165-17652022Elsevierhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/BiddingFirst-price auctionsExperimentInverse S-shaped probability weightingBiasSozialwissenschaften, SoziologieWirtschaftJournal Article10.15480/882.466010.1016/j.econlet.2022.11089110.15480/882.4660Journal Article