Brosig-Koch, JeannetteJeannetteBrosig-KochHeinrich, TimoTimoHeinrich2021-03-102021-03-102012-08-17Production and Operations Management 23 (2): 210-220 (2014-02)http://hdl.handle.net/11420/9109We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply higher quality in buyer-determined auctions leading to higher market efficiencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the buyer-determined auction over the price-based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers' and bidders' behavior and profits provides insights into their mechanism choice. © 2012 Production and Operations Management Society.en1937-595620122210220Wiley-Blackwellhttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/auction choicebuyer-determined and price-based procurementexperimental economicssupplier reputationWirtschaftJournal Article10.15480/882.466210.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01365.x10.15480/882.4662Journal Article