A systematic study of cache side channels across AES implementations

Publikationstyp
Conference Paper
Date Issued
2017-07
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Mantel, Heiko 
Weber, Alexandra  
Köpf, Boris  
TORE-URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11420/13859
First published in
Lecture notes in computer science  
Number in series
10379 LNCS
Start Page
213
End Page
230
Citation
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10379 LNCS: 213-230 (2017)
Contribution to Conference
9th International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, ESSoS 2017  
Publisher DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-62105-0_14
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85022344059
Publisher
Springer International Publishing AG
ISBN of container
978-3-319-62105-0
978-3-319-62104-3
While the AES algorithm is regarded as secure, many implementations of AES are prone to cache side-channel attacks. The lookup tables traditionally used in AES implementations for storing precomputed results provide speedup for encryption and decryption. How such lookup tables are used is known to affect the vulnerability to side channels, but the concrete effects in actual AES implementations are not yet sufficiently well understood. In this article, we analyze and compare multiple off-the-shelf AES implementations wrt. their vulnerability to cache side-channel attacks. By applying quantitative program analysis techniques in a systematic fashion, we shed light on the influence of implementation techniques for AES on cache-side-channel leakage bounds.
DDC Class
004: Informatik