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Verifiable side-channel security
Citation Link: https://doi.org/10.15480/882.13604
Publikationstyp
Doctoral Thesis
Date Issued
2024
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Advisor
Referee
Title Granting Institution
Technische Universität Hamburg
Place of Title Granting Institution
Hamburg
Examination Date
2024-05-16
TORE-DOI
Citation
Technische Universität Hamburg (2024)
The protection of cryptographic implementations against side-channel attacks is essential. Masking is a commonly used countermeasure but manifold pitfalls render this method insecure in practice. This doctoral thesis considers formal verification for qualitative assessments of physical side-channel resilience during development. We show that verification allows masking larger software implementations attaining security in practice at reduced overhead. The work contributes to formal modeling of physical leakage, the first approach to verify model completeness, security reductions and resilient post-quantum cryptography.
Subjects
Information security
Cryptography
Side-channel
Leakage model
Verifiable security
Formal verification
DDC Class
005: Computer Programming, Programs, Data and Security
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publishedVersion
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Gourjon_Marc_Verifiable_Side-Channel_Security.pdf
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2.84 MB
Format
Adobe PDF