Communication and reputation in procurement auctions - Some empirical evidence

Publikationstyp
Journal Article
Date Issued
2012-02
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Heinrich, Timo  orcid-logo
TORE-URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11420/9098
Journal
Economics letters  
Volume
114
Issue
2
Start Page
164
End Page
167
Citation
Economics Letters 114 (2): 164-167 (2012-02)
Publisher DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.014
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-80855156543
This paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder's probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.
Subjects
Communication
Procurement auctions
Reputation