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Moral and non-moral testimony - Revisiting an alleged asymmetry
Publikationstyp
Review Article
Date Issued
2017
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Journal
Volume
31
Issue
1
Start Page
25
End Page
44
Citation
Kriterion 31 (1): 25-44 (2017)
Scopus ID
In this essay, I oppose the 'Asymmetry Thesis' according to which moral matters are simply different in kind from non-moral matters when it comes to testimony because moral matters require understanding in a way in which non-moral matters do not. I argue that the requirement of understanding is not unique to morality and also deny that there is a genuine requirement of understanding after all. Instead, cases of moral and non-moral testimony are often troubling for the same reason, namely the violation of the requirement of using one's own cognitive faculties when it is both possible and feasible. I will argue for this account in two stages: Firstly, I will present particular examples of testimony which aim to render this proposal initially plausible via inductive reasoning. Secondly, I will present a transcendental argument from the social function of testimony and explain why such a requirement in fact holds.
Subjects
Asymmetry
Epistemic autonomy
Moral
Testimony
Understanding