Comparing countermeasures against interrupt-related covert channels in an information-theoretic framework

Publikationstyp
Conference Paper
Date Issued
2007-07
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Mantel, Heiko 
Sudbrock, Henning  
TORE-URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11420/13916
Start Page
326
End Page
340
Article Number
4271658
Citation
20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium CSFS 2007: 4271658, 326-340 (2007)
Contribution to Conference
20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSFS 2007  
Publisher DOI
10.1109/CSF.2007.14
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-35048834771
Publisher
IEEE
Interrupt-driven communication with hardware devices can be exploited for establishing covert channels. In this article, we propose an information-theoretic framework for analyzing the bandwidth of such interrupt-related channels while taking aspects of noise into account. As countermeasures, we present mechanisms that are already implemented in some operating systems, though for a different purpose. Based on our formal framework, the effectiveness of the mechanisms is evaluated. Despite the large body of work on covert channels, this is the first comprehensive account of interrupt-related covert channel analysis and mitigation.
DDC Class
004: Informatik