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  4. High-order punishment and the evolution of cooperation
 
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High-order punishment and the evolution of cooperation

Publikationstyp
Journal Article
Date Issued
2006-10
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Baranski, Bastian  
Schmitt, Karlheinz  
Seis, Danny  
Slodzinski, Rafael  
Steeg, Simon  
Wiemann, Nils  
Zimmermann, Marc  
Bartz-Beielstein, Thomas  
Ehlers, Rüdiger  
Kajendran, Thusinthan  
Kosslers, Björn  
Mehnen, Jörn  
Polaszek, Tomasz  
Reimholz, Ralf  
Schmidt, Jens M.  orcid-logo
TORE-URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11420/7636
Start Page
379
Citation
8th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation (GECCO 2006)
Publisher DOI
10.1145/1143997.1144065
The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates that high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation.
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