On enhancing the security against memory disclosure attacks

Main memory is a critical component for storing computational data across various applications, including highly sensitive information such as banking transactions, encryption keys, and authentication credentials. However, memory systems are susceptible to side-channel attacks, making it imperative to implement effective countermeasures against unauthorized data extraction. Additionally, counterfeit memory controllers and memory devices pose a significant security risk, as they can facilitate data leakage even in the presence of conventional encryption mechanisms. Traditional security solutions, such as AES encryption integrated into memory controllers, provide strong cryptographic protection; however, they introduce substantial latency and area overhead. This paper presents a novel security countermeasure that ensures secure communication between the memory controller and the memory device by employing XOR-based encryption and decryption at both ends. The proposed technique remains secure even in the presence of unauthenticated memory components, preventing unauthorized data access. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves a high level of security (2512) while significantly reducing area overhead and incurring no additional access latency.

Subjects

Memory disclosure attacks

Cold boot attacks

DMA attacks

DRAM

LFSR

Warm boot attacks

DDC Class

004: Computer Sciences

Options

On enhancing the security against memory disclosure attacks