Resilience of process control systems to cyber-physical attacks

Publikationstyp
Conference Paper
Date Issued
2013
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Krotofil, Marina  orcid-logo
Cárdenas, Alvaro A.  
Institut
Sicherheit in verteilten Anwendungen E-15  
TORE-URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11420/7525
Start Page
166
End Page
182
Citation
Secure IT systems : 18th nordic conference, NordSec 2013, Ilulissat, Greenland, October 18-21, 2013 ; proceedings / Hanne Riis Nielson; Dieter Gollmann (eds.). - Berlin ; Heidelberg [u.a.] : Springer, 2013 . - (Lecture notes in computer science ; 8208 LNCS). - Seite 166-182
Contribution to Conference
18th NordSec 2013  
Publisher DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-41488-6_12
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-84890876283
In this work we investigate the matter of "secure control" - a novel research direction capturing security objectives specific to Industrial Control Systems (ICS). We provide an empirical analysis of the well known Tennessee Eastman process control challenge problem to gain insights into the behavior of a physical process when confronted with cyber-physical attacks. In particular, we investigate the impact of integrity and DoS attacks on sensors which measure physical phenomena. We also demonstrate how the results of process-aware security analysis can be applied to improve process resilience to cyber-physical attacks. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
Subjects
Cyber-physical attacks
secure control
simulations
Tennessee-Eastman process
DDC Class
004: Informatik