TUHH Open Research
Help
  • Log In
    New user? Click here to register.Have you forgotten your password?
  • English
  • Deutsch
  • Communities & Collections
  • Publications
  • Research Data
  • People
  • Institutions
  • Projects
  • Statistics
  1. Home
  2. TUHH
  3. Publication References
  4. What can self-admitted technical debt tell us about security? A mixed-methods study
 
Options

What can self-admitted technical debt tell us about security? A mixed-methods study

Publikationstyp
Conference Paper
Date Issued
2024
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Díaz Ferreyra, Nicolás  orcid-logo
Software Security E-22  
Shahin, Mojtaba
Zahedi, Mansooreh
Quadri, Sodiq  
Studiendekanat Elektrotechnik, Informatik und Mathematik (E)  
Scandariato, Riccardo  
Software Security E-22  
TORE-URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11420/48438
Start Page
704
End Page
715
Citation
IEEE/ACM 21st International Conference on Mining Software Repositories, MSR 2024
Contribution to Conference
IEEE/ACM 21st International Conference on Mining Software Repositories, MSR 2024
Publisher DOI
10.1145/3643991.3644909
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85197378063
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN
9798400705878
Is Supplemented By
11420/52052
Self-Admitted Technical Debt (SATD) encompasses a wide array of sub-optimal design and implementation choices reported in software artefacts (e.g., code comments and commit messages) by developers themselves. Such reports have been central to the study of software maintenance and evolution over the last decades. However, they can also be deemed as dreadful sources of information on potentially exploitable vulnerabilities and security flaws. Objective: This work investigates the security implications of SATD from a technical and developer-centred perspective. On the one hand, it analyses whether security pointers disclosed inside SATD sources can be used to characterise vulnerabilities in Open-Source Software (OSS) projects and repositories. On the other hand, it delves into developers' perspectives regarding the motivations behind this practice, its prevalence, and its potential negative consequences. Method: We followed a mixed-methods approach consisting of (i) the analysis of a preexisting dataset containing 8,812 SATD instances and (ii) an online survey with 222 OSS practitioners. Results: We gathered 201 SATD instances through the dataset analysis and mapped them to different Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers. Overall, 25 different types of CWEs were spotted across commit messages, pull requests, code comments, and issue sections, from which 8 appear among MITRE's Top-25 most dangerous ones. The survey shows that software practitioners often place security pointers across SATD artefacts to promote a security culture among their peers and help them spot flaky code sections, among other motives. However, they also consider such a practice risky as it may facilitate vulnerability exploits. Implications: Our findings suggest that preserving the contextual integrity of security pointers disseminated across SATD artefacts is critical to safeguard both commercial and OSS solutions against zero-day attacks.CCS CONCEPTS•Security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of security and privacy; Software security engineering; • Software and its engineering → Maintaining software.
Subjects
self-admitted technical debt
software engineering
software security
technical debt identification
DDC Class
005: Computer Programming, Programs, Data and Security
TUHH
Weiterführende Links
  • Contact
  • Send Feedback
  • Cookie settings
  • Privacy policy
  • Impress
DSpace Software

Built with DSpace-CRIS software - Extension maintained and optimized by 4Science
Design by effective webwork GmbH

  • Deutsche NationalbibliothekDeutsche Nationalbibliothek
  • ORCiD Member OrganizationORCiD Member Organization
  • DataCiteDataCite
  • Re3DataRe3Data
  • OpenDOAROpenDOAR
  • OpenAireOpenAire
  • BASE Bielefeld Academic Search EngineBASE Bielefeld Academic Search Engine
Feedback