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Conventions and the normativity of law
Publikationstyp
Review Article
Date Issued
2018-04
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Volume
104
Issue
2
Start Page
220
End Page
231
Citation
Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 104 (2): 220-231 (2018-04)
Publisher DOI
Scopus ID
This essay criticises the atempt to explain the so-called normativity of law with reference to a model of coordination conventions. After specifying the explanandum of the normativity of law, I lay out the conceptions of 'coordination' and 'convention' and how the combination of both sets out to contribute to legal philosophy. I then present two arguments against such an account. Firstly, along a reductio ad absurdum, I claim that if an account of coordination conventions tries to explain the normativity of law by focusing on a coordination problem among judges it leads to self-contradiction. Secondly, I argue that even if one allows for widening the coordination problem beyond the group of judges, one is unable to account for the notion of duty. I will substantiate this second argument by distinguishing different scopes of the deontic operator "ought". I conclude by reconsidering what explaining the normativity of law could amount to.
Subjects
Contingency of law
Convention
Coordination
Instrumental rationality
Judicial duty
Legal positivism
Normativity of law
Rules of recognition