Deterministic impartial selection with weights

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size k among a group of n is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being selected by changing its vote. It is α-optimal if, for every instance, the ratio between the votes received by the selected subset is at least a fraction of α of the votes received by the subset of size k with the highest number of votes. We study deterministic impartial mechanisms in a more general setting with arbitrarily weighted votes and provide the first approximation guarantee, roughly 1/[2n/k]. When the number of agents to select is large enough compared to the total number of agents, this yields an improvement on the previously best-known approximation ratio of 1/k for the unweighted setting. We further show that our mechanism can be adapted to the impartial assignment problem, in which multiple sets of up to k agents are to be selected, with a loss in the approximation ratio of 1/2.

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Additional Key Words and PhrasesImpartial selection

computational social choice

DDC Class

510: Mathematics

302: Social Interaction

005: Computer Programming, Programs, Data and Security

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Deterministic impartial selection with weights