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The courtesy game
Citation Link: https://doi.org/10.15480/882.14954
Publikationstyp
Working Paper
Date Issued
2025-03-21
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Meemann, Christina
TORE-DOI
Citation
Technische Universität Hamburg (2025)
Peer Reviewed
false
Abstract In this paper, we study the role of courtesy in the solution of asymmetric social dilemmas. To this end, we introduce a novel game, the Courtesy Game, and show with the help of a laboratory experiment that an efficient equilibrium in the form of turn-taking, i.e., alternate play of the weakly dominant and weakly dominated strategies of the stage game, only emerges in a partner matching and in a few groups in which certain players take the lead. One conclusion from this result is that a ‘courtesy equilibrium’ does not arise spontaneously but requires explicit rules of conduct.
Subjects
Courtesy Game | Social Dilemma | Social Preferences | Turn- Taking | Experiment
DDC Class
302: Social Interaction
300: Social Sciences
330: Economics
519: Applied Mathematics, Probabilities
Publication version
draft
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Name
Courtesy.pdf
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1.23 MB
Format
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