Costly information acquisition : the influence of stakeholder earnings

Publikationstyp
Journal Article
Date Issued
2022-06
Sprache
English
Author(s)
Heinrich, Timo  orcid-logo
Arya, Bindu  
Haering, Alexander  
Horak, Sven  
Institut
Digital Economics W-5  
TORE-DOI
10.15480/882.4729
TORE-URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11420/11802
Journal
Journal of economic psychology  
Volume
90
Article Number
102504
Citation
Journal of Economic Psychology 90: 102504 (2022)
Publisher DOI
10.1016/j.joep.2022.102504
Scopus ID
2-s2.0-85126754931
Publisher
Elsevier
Information is often acquired within organizations that generate earnings for employees and stakeholders. In this paper we analyze the causal effects of inequality on information acquisition performance and vary the pay of agents relative to the earnings of passive stakeholders. Our experimental results reveal that disadvantageous inequality does not have a negative effect on agents’ performance.
Subjects
Information acquisition
Pay inequality
Stakeholders
DDC Class
330: Wirtschaft
Publication version
acceptedVersion
Lizenz
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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