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A note on reciprocity and modified dictator games
Citation Link: https://doi.org/10.15480/882.4674
Publikationstyp
Journal Article
Publikationsdatum
2013-08-14
Sprache
English
TORE-URI
Enthalten in
Volume
121
Issue
2
Start Page
202
End Page
205
Citation
Economics Letters 121 (2): 202-205 (2013-11)
Publisher DOI
Scopus ID
Publisher
Elsevier
This note presents results from modified dictator games in which the payoff-relevant game is either chosen randomly or by the recipients. We do not observe reciprocal behavior when recipients choose the game: Dictators do not condition their donations on the game chosen by recipients.
Schlagworte
Laboratory experiments
Modified dictator games
Reciprocity
DDC Class
000: Allgemeines, Wissenschaft
Publication version
acceptedVersion
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note_on_reciprocity.pdf
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