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Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Revalidating a survey instrument for measuring risk preferencesSurvey instruments are often a cost-effective alternative to eliciting preferences via incentivized experiments. We revalidate a survey instrument used for measuring risk preferences in the influential Global Preferences Survey. We find that the instrument consisting of a quantitative and a qualitative item predicts risk aversion in a Chinese, an American and a German sample. For out-of-sample predictions, the combination of both items is preferable compared to using only one of the two items.Publicationtype: Journal Article45 98 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctionsIn first price sealed-bid auctions, a power probability weighting function is observationally equivalent to a model with constant relative risk aversion. By comparing auctions with different ceilings on a computerized opponent’s bid space, we can separate inverse S-shaped probability weighting as commonly used in the literature and risk-averse preferences from the distribution of observed bids. We find evidence to support both theories in the data. However, we also observe a significant number of violations after accounting for decision noise, which suggest that bidders’ valuations may be malleable to cues of the auction environment.Publicationtype: Journal ArticleScopus© Citations 1 149 185 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Near-losses in insurance markets : an experimentSeveral studies report changes in risk taking subsequent to experiencing near-loss events. We disentangle strategic and non-strategic reactions to such near-losses experimentally. We observe that near-losses affect the supply and demand for insurance under strategic uncertainty but not individual evaluations.Publicationtype: Journal ArticleScopus© Citations 1 138 119 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Does truth win when teams reason strategically?We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can create synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends neither on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our results reveal that teams not only outperform individuals but that they can also beat the "truth-wins" benchmark. In particular, varying the length of the race game we find that the team advantage increases with the complexity of the game.Publicationtype: Journal ArticleScopus© Citations 3 64 141 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , A note on reciprocity and modified dictator gamesThis note presents results from modified dictator games in which the payoff-relevant game is either chosen randomly or by the recipients. We do not observe reciprocal behavior when recipients choose the game: Dictators do not condition their donations on the game chosen by recipients.Publicationtype: Journal ArticleScopus© Citations 1 64 172 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: without files , Communication and reputation in procurement auctions - Some empirical evidence(2012-02)This paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder's probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.Publicationtype: Journal Article34