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    Item type:Publication, Access status: with files ,
    The courtesy game
    (2025-03-21) ;
    Meemann, Christina
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    ;
    Abstract In this paper, we study the role of courtesy in the solution of asymmetric social dilemmas. To this end, we introduce a novel game, the Courtesy Game, and show with the help of a laboratory experiment that an efficient equilibrium in the form of turn-taking, i.e., alternate play of the weakly dominant and weakly dominated strategies of the stage game, only emerges in a partner matching and in a few groups in which certain players take the lead. One conclusion from this result is that a ‘courtesy equilibrium’ does not arise spontaneously but requires explicit rules of conduct.
    Publicationtype: Working Paper
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