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Item type:Publication, Access status: without files , (Autonomous) weapon transfers as maximal jus ad vim? Lessons from UkraineSome scenarios justify the use of force, yet overriding political, moral or strategic concerns may argue against the outright use of a state's military. In such cases, transfers of weapons present would-be aiding states with means to apply force-short-of-war, or jus ad vim. This article argues that transferring sophisticated autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems represents a maximal means for exerting force without implicating one's own military or state in a direct fashion. Moreover, the article argues that, because such weapons can be argued to be merely weapons, such transfers allow one to avoid (or at least mitigate) concerns surrounding escalation while also working to avoid the risks of a ‘morally truncated victory’ or a situation of vis perpetua (permanent violence). In making these points, the article regularly looks to the ongoing example provided by the Russo-Ukrainian war, concluding with a practical examination of the limits of autonomous weapons and when their impact may not be as significant for the prospects of an aided state.Publicationtype: Journal Article20 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Stop saying "AI"(Springer, 2026-05-27); ; ; Across academia, industry, and government, “AI” has become central in research and development, regulatory debates, and promises of ever faster and more capable decision-making and action. In numerous domains, especially safety-critical ones, there are significant concerns over how “AI” may affect decision-making, responsibility, or the likelihood of mistakes (to name only a few categories of critique). However, for most critiques, the target is generally “AI”, a broad term admitting many (types of) systems used for a variety of tasks and each coming with its own set of limitations, challenges, and potential use cases. In this article, we focus on the military domain as a case study and present both a loose enumerative taxonomy of systems captured under the umbrella term “military AI”, as well as discussion of the challenges of each. In doing so, we highlight that critiques of one (type of) system will not always transfer to other (types of) systems. Building on this, we argue that in order for debates to move forward fruitfully, it is imperative that the discussions be made more precise and that “AI” be excised from debates to the extent possible, especially as discussions move more toward discrete systems and use cases. Researchers, developers, and policy-makers should make clear exactly what systems they have in mind and what possible benefits and risks attend the deployment of those particular systems. While we focus on AI in the military as an exemplar for the overall trends in discussions of “AI”, the argument’s conclusions are broad and have import for discussions of AI across a host of domains.Publicationtype: Journal Article61 10 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: without files , Power and politics in the design of autonomous and AI-enabled weaponsA weapon is a weapon, and nothing about its general “weaponness” seems to indicate much about its underlying values. However, closer examination of weapons’ designs can tell us much. For whom were they designed? Have safeguards been put into place? If so, which ones, and to the protection of whom? Autonomous weapons have existed for decades, and AI-powered and AI-enabled systems are becoming increasingly important, but all of these systems raise ethical and legal concerns. Arguably, many of the challenges might feasibly be addressed through design or institutional solutions, but importantly, how systems are designed says a great deal about those designing them and those contemplating their deployment. In this chapter, I argue that if states wish to demonstrate their commitment to human rights and the protection of innocent lives, autonomous and AI-enabled systems in the military must fulfill several design desiderata: predictability, governability, responsibility, and traceability. I then explore concrete ways these desiderata may be fulfilled in practice.Publicationtype: Book Part14 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Bombs, bots, and the principle of distinction: the law of armed conflict and contemporary warfareCritics of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) argue that these weapons cannot reliably distinguish between legitimate targets and those protected from attack. As a result, the use of AWS seems to violate the principle of distinction under international humanitarian law (IHL), which requires that combatants “not make civilians the object of attack” and not carry out attacks that are “indiscriminate in nature.” This criticism, however, misunderstands the principle of distinction and ignores important aspects of how AWS are being developed and deployed. Critics rely on an overly broad definition of AWS, and hold these systems to a standard that is inconsistent with the principle of distinction as it is actually formulated under IHL. Despite their very real limitations, the characteristics of modern AWS in fact highlight an impressive feat of technological design, and mark a further step on our long and fitful road to making warfare a less brutal and bloody enterprise.Publicationtype: Journal Article11 7 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Autonomous and AI-enabled systems: extensions or replacements of human will and control?Use of autonomous, AI-enabled, or opaque systems raises many concerns, and some argue that for these to be permissibly deployed in high-stakes or critical domains, they must be subject to so-called “meaningful human control” (MHC). In this article, I focus on the military domain and rebut a strong version of this critique, arguing that off-the-loop systems – i.e., those which can select and engage targets without contemporaneous human input or oversight – can be permissibly deployed while retaining clear lines of responsibility and control. I show that ex ante operational constraints and targeting parameters can provide combatants and would-be deployers of off-the-loop systems with strong means to ensure that deployed systems are serving as extensions of combatants’ wills, establishing the necessary degree of moral and legal responsibility required. I further show that such constraints and parameters represent clear lines of control that deployers have over such systems, even when these systems, during deployments, are utterly outside of human control. I conclude by distinguishing between what I call “will-extending” and “will-offloading” systems, showing that off-the-loop systems can serve to extend users’ and deployers’ wills, making such systems inherently subject to meaningful human control. Throughout, the discussion focuses on the example of autonomous and AI-enabled systems in the military domain, but the underlying arguments relate to such systems more generally, showing how these, if utilized as “will-extending” systems, may be used in a controlled and responsibility-retaining manner.Publicationtype: Journal Article31 20 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Virtues and rules in war: military ethics and technologies of radical risk-reductionOn a contentious but still widely held view of the ethics of war, belligerents’ mutual imposition of risk licenses the harm they attempt to inflict upon each other. When this reciprocity of risk imposition is lost—when combatants of one side are able to inflict harm without exposing themselves to it—the moral balance is disrupted. Technologies that radically reduce risk, such as UAVs (drones) or autonomous weapon systems, are particularly challenging in this respect. Scholars have suggested that these technologies of radical risk reduction are so morally disruptive that the ethics of war should fundamentally shift from virtue-based towards rule-based approaches. According to this view, since the traditional martial virtues (such as courage and mercy) are of little practical relevance to certain forms of modern warfare, drone pilots and other soldiers who dole out violence from great distances would be better served by clear moral rules. We argue, however, that this view is mistaken. That technologies of radical risk reduction bring some disruption to the martial virtues is undeniable, but the disruption is far less severe than has been suggested. We present an alternative account of the moral disruption caused by technologies of radical risk-reduction, highlighting how the changing nature of warfare is informing changes in what morality and virtue demand in war. Martial virtues continue to play a crucial role in ethical decision-making, as the moral performance of drone pilots in Ukraine has clearly demonstrated. We continue to have, therefore, strong reasons to educate and entrench a conception of the ‘virtuous warrior’ in today’s soldiers.Publicationtype: Journal Article25 18 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Access status: with files , Autonomous weapons for humanity: lessons from the Russo-Ukrainain warThough autonomous weapon systems (AWS) fulfill a number of critical combat roles, and have done so for decades, ethical and legal worries have been raised in relation to recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and the possibility for more open-ended or versatile deployments of these systems. In particular, the potential for AWS to be used in anti-personnel roles is argued by many to present especially difficult issues ranging from concerns over the dignity of those targeted by such systems to practical worries that AWS will be incapable of making the nuanced judgments required for distinguishing combatants from civilians. However, the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War highlights a potential response to these objections, namely that autonomous weapons may be deployed in order to further humanitarian aims by providing a means for would-be interveners to create humanitarian corridors for fleeing civilians. The argument focuses on one of the most objectionable forms of AWS, namely explicitly anti-personnel systems which aim to kill combatants, and argues that even rudimentary AWS with limited abilities of distinction could be used to bolster humanitarian aims while adding only a minimal risk to civilians. This is because object recognition in computer systems has reached a level where such systems would be able to rather reliably determine whether an individual is armed or not (and these capabilities are continually improving), and based on this criterion alone AWS could be deployed to create safe corridors of retreat for fleeing civilians. Such corridors could be marked to all sides in a conflict, their locations communicated to civilians seeking refuge, and the AWS programmed to lethally engage anyone entering the designated corridor who is armed. As the purpose of humanitarian corridors is to enable civilians to safely exit a combat zone, there is no good reason for armed units of either side to enter such a space, and so targeting based solely on whether or not one is armed could also be used as a means to show resolve in furthering humanitarian aims while taking a decidedly neutral position in the conflict itself. AWS deployed for such purposes could thus engage armed units with far less discrimination, aiming at anyone who is armed, rather than only "enemy" combatants, and the securing of such corridors through wholly unmanned systems has the added benefit that it risks no lives of would-be interveners, making participation more likely. The general simplicity of the targeting parameters for AWS deployed to such tasks (if armed, engage, otherwise, not) would furthermore ensure that the interveners could only be utilizing their autonomous weapons for purely humanitarian aims rather than as a cover for bolstering the position of one side in a conflict. The arguments further highlight a potential use-case for what is widely considered one of the most objectionable forms of AWS, presenting a counterpoint to critics' claims.Publicationtype: Book Part38 15